

Community-oriented analytical approach rediscovered



Cliché picture of NGOs in Africa¹



Other side of NGO work²

Radboud University Nijmegen
Conflicts, Territories & Identities
Political and Geographical Conflict Resolution
End paper

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February 2nd, 2011
Word count: 2722 words

¹ http://www.yachana.org/blog/2009_10_01_archive.html February 2nd, 2011

² <http://www.humansecurity-chs.org/newsandevents/index.html> February 2nd, 2011

Introduction

In the short history of conflict resolution³, several approaches were developed and practiced, which all have their pro's and con's. By having applied the approaches in peace missions, many successes have been accomplished, but much can improve even more. For the current era, the main lesson to be (re)discovered is to take the local level serious. This approach has been labeled as 'community-oriented analytical approach', or 'exotic localism' in informal discussions. First this approach and its advantages are discussed. Subsequently the other approaches, mainly focusing on their disadvantages, are explained. After having shown the disadvantages of community-oriented analytical approach, it will be concluded that a new form of that approach should solve most current problems, which will result in better ways of transforming violent conflict into positive peace.

The community-oriented analytical approach

Béatrice Pouligny is a supporter of the community-oriented analytical approach. The approach:

*"implies fundamental changes in the intelligence and communication capacities of outsiders, in order that they might better understand local contexts and, more particularly, identify the local actors likely to be the major motors for change (...) [it means] simply taking stock of what various social science disciplines have to say about the situations under consideration, and using that knowledge within an operational analytical approach"*⁴.

In practice this means that outside interveners need to extend their knowledge and communication to local circumstances, and that not they themselves, but local people (either grouped in local NGOs or individuals) are the most important actors. Not all knowledge needs to come from the locals themselves, also social sciences can be used. Additionally Pouligny notes that international organizations and international NGOs should see themselves as facilitators, not as key actors, in a leverage process⁵.

Advantages of the community-oriented analytical approach

There are several advantages of this approach.

Firstly, the use of local resources (people and products) has advantages in time: it reduces the time needed for conflict resolution to start, and the organizations will not leave after a certain period. Ball, on the case of DDR-processes, states that timing is important: *"donors should be prepared to act early on, ideally before wars actually end"*⁶. Early intervention in the conflict can save lives. At the larger scale level of the international community, much time is needed to discuss whether or not to intervene, and if so, how and who will do it. At the local level the need for intervention is clear to the people, and local people and NGOs will have less choice on how to intervene: they will simply do whatever they are capable of. Even more time is saved since the people and products are geographically near the conflict area. Also, local resources are present for a long period of time. Mainly the first period after conflict is critical and at the end of this period the international community has often already left⁷. This approach also focuses on achieving positive peace and not on the mere absence of violence⁸.

³ In this paper, the term 'conflict resolution' is used. This includes all stages after wars in this context, ranging from mediation to peace-, state-, and societybuilding. For sake of simplicity conflict resolution here means the general approach after violent conflict.

⁴ Pouligny, B. (2005). *"Civil society and post-conflict peace-building: ambiguities of international programmes aimed at building 'new' societies"*. In: Security Dialogue 36(4), p.507.

⁵ Pouligny, B. (2005). *"Civil society and post-conflict peace-building: ambiguities of international programmes aimed at building 'new' societies"*. In: Security Dialogue 36(4), p.508

⁶ Ball, N. (1997). *"Demobilizing and reintegrating soldiers: lessons from Africa"*. In: Krishna Kumar ed., *Rebuilding society after civil war: critical roles for international assistance*, Lynne Rienner, Boulder-London, p.92

⁷ Pouligny, B. (2005). *"Civil society and post-conflict peace-building: ambiguities of international programmes aimed at building 'new' societies"*. In: Security Dialogue 36(4), p.503

⁸ Pouligny, B. (2005). *"Civil society and post-conflict peace-building: ambiguities of international programmes aimed at building 'new' societies"*. In: Security Dialogue 36(4), p.506

A second advantage of local resources is the reduction and stability in costs. International staff and material resources are more expensive than local resources, even without the travelling expenses. Also, because the local resources will stay within the country, there is stability in costs: local NGOs and people will not disappear after a few years, which sometimes is the case with the international community.

Thirdly, since local people and resources are embedded in the local culture, the chance on local support is big. Currently people sometimes turn against international missions because it is not seen as representative of their norms and values. For example in Afghanistan and Iraq, where some people see the Western countries as an invading force that wants to implement 'their' democratic ideas. Local support is crucial for success. For example, "*Security Sector Reform cannot be implemented successfully without the co-operation of those who stand to lose the most from the process*"⁹. With local support, the confidence in the own society will grow which will cause an upward spiral of development. When organized by local people, the population will be motivated to help since it gives meaning to their life and may help in processing the past. "*For both consociational democracy and corporatism to work well, the population needs to identify with and feel loyalty to its social sectors*"¹⁰.

By using the local culture, cultural mistakes will additionally be avoided¹¹. In many international situations it is difficult to completely understand and cooperate with one another and this can now be avoided by using more local people and knowledge of the society. Also, in international missions the root-causes of conflicts are sometimes misunderstood. Local people will know these and consequently the right steps will be taken from the start¹².

There are two last advantages. The first is that the diverse character of local help has proven useful in splintered post-war societies¹³. Secondly, some things do not need help: for example, refugee return often occurs spontaneously¹⁴. So instead of the international community interfering in this, local actors could study whether it is necessary to help in this, and eventually help if needed.

Other approaches

There are three other major approaches in conflict resolution: critical theory; liberal peace; and (un)critical peacebuilding. Their pro's and con's are explained here.

Critical theory

This theory looks extremely critical at former forms of conflict resolution: former interventions were a form of political contestation; there was lack of respect for international law and arbitrary and ad hoc use of military force on the basis of the political stakes involved¹⁵. Where there is lack of political stakes, no intervention will be made¹⁶. This critical view questions whether interventions should be made at all; and if so it states that it should be done radically different from the current approach.

It is useful to rethink why external actors should intervene in the first place, and which goals and assumptions are behind it. The community-oriented analytical approach also highlights this.

⁹ Smith, C. (2004). "*Security-sector reform: development breakthrough or institutional engineering?*". In: Conflict, Security & Development 1(1), p.14.

¹⁰ Barnes, S.H. (2001). "*The contribution of democracy to rebuilding post-conflict societies*". In: American Journal of International Law 95(1), p.100.

¹¹ Pouligny, B. (2005). "*Civil society and post-conflict peace-building: ambiguities of international programmes aimed at building 'new' societies*". In: Security Dialogue 36(4), p.502

¹² Säve-Söderbergh, B. & Lennartsson, I.N. (2002). "*Electoral assistance and democratization*". In: F.O. Hampson & D.M. Malone eds., From reaction to conflict prevention: opportunities for the UN system, Lynne Rienner, Boulder-London, p.359.

¹³ Pouligny, B. (2005). "*Civil society and post-conflict peace-building: ambiguities of international programmes aimed at building 'new' societies*". In: Security Dialogue 36(4), p.499

¹⁴ Adelman, H. (2002). "*Refugee repatriation*". In: S.J. Stedman, D> Rothchild & E.M. Cousens eds., Ending civil wars: the implementation of peace agreements, Lynne Rienner, Boulder-London, p.283.

¹⁵ Chandler, D. (2009). "*War without end(s): grounding the discourse of 'global wars'*". In: Security Dialogue 40(3), p.259.

¹⁶ Chandler, D. (2009). "*War without end(s): grounding the discourse of 'global wars'*". In: Security Dialogue 40(3), p.258.

However the alternative of doing nothing is not very realistic. In this era of globalization and weapons of mass destruction, allowing conflicts is too dangerous. Due to globalization, the Western population sees every disaster across the globe, and consequently feels the need to do something: *“yet for their [the West’s] own domestic audiences presented with another African famine, for example, they cannot also be seen to be doing nothing”*¹⁷. Also, although one can be sceptical, it is interesting to remember the following quote:

*“Demonstrating that aid does harm is not the same as demonstrating that no aid would do no harm”*¹⁸

No aid will definitely do harm, it will result in more victims compared to situations where aid is given, even though the method of aid at this moment may not be the best one.

Liberal peace and (un)critical peacebuilding

Before explaining both approaches separately, the pro’s and con’s of both approaches can be given. Both promote intervention of the international community, that strives to creating market democracies. This mainly has advantages in funding, either via monetary and/or material and/or personal means.

However the presence of the international community has distorting/perverse effects on the economy of a country: local prices go up; local people switch to professions that make money and forget their own profession, etcetera¹⁹.

Also, the fact that the international community invades a country and takes control, in order to give the local government autonomous control, seems contradicting²⁰. When the international community is the lead actor in institution building, it undermines the emergence of local organizational capacity²¹. Sometimes the armed conflict will not likely be stopped without external intervention, but at the same time, the external presence diminishes the autonomous strength of contenders²². The international presence can even directly hinder the process by which contenders reach peace by themselves²³, and regarding elections, it limits the degree of autonomy and efficacy of the election²⁴.

Another disadvantage of international interference is the interest of the international community in keeping the accords on track in the short run, which sometimes directly conflicts with longer-term goals. The international community has separate security interests which may not converge with the overall development of citizen oriented, rights-respecting systems of public security and justice²⁵.

¹⁷ Shearer, D. (2000). “Aiding or abetting? Humanitarian aid and its economic role in civil war”. In: M. Berdal & D.M. Malone eds., *Greed and Grievance: economic agendas in civil wars*, Lynne Rienner, Boulder-London, p.198

¹⁸ Anderson in Shearer, D. (2000). “Aiding or abetting? Humanitarian aid and its economic role in civil war”. In: M. Berdal & D.M. Malone eds., *Greed and Grievance: economic agendas in civil wars*, Lynne Rienner, Boulder-London, p.200.

¹⁹ see for example Woodward, S.L. (2002). “Economic priorities for successful peace implementation”. In: S.J. Stedman, D. Rothchild & E.M. Cousens eds., *Ending civil wars: the implementation of peace agreements*, Lynne Rienner, Boulder-London, p.208-9. And Chesterman, S. (2004). *Justice and reconciliation: the rule of law in post-conflict territories*. In: *You the People: The United Nations, transitional administration and state-building*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, p.200.

²⁰ Lopéz-Pintor, R. (1997). *Reconciliation elections: a post-Cold War experience*. In: Krishna Kumar ed., *Rebuilding society after civil war: critical roles for international assistance*, Lynne Rienner, Boulder-London, p.47

²¹ Grindle, M.S. (2004). *Good enough governance: poverty reduction and reform in developing countries*. In: *Governance* 17(4) p.540. And Putnam, T.L. (2002). *Human rights and sustainable peace*. In: S.J. Stedman, D. Rothchild & E.M. Cousens eds., *Ending civil wars: the implementation of peace agreements*, Lynne Rienner, Boulder-London, p.249.

²² Lopéz-Pintor, R. (1997). *Reconciliation elections: a post-Cold War experience*. In: Krishna Kumar ed., *Rebuilding society after civil war: critical roles for international assistance*, Lynne Rienner, Boulder-London, p.49

²³ Lopéz-Pintor, R. (1997). *Reconciliation elections: a post-Cold War experience*. In: Krishna Kumar ed., *Rebuilding society after civil war: critical roles for international assistance*, Lynne Rienner, Boulder-London, p.47

²⁴ Lopéz-Pintor, R. (1997). *Reconciliation elections: a post-Cold War experience*. In: Krishna Kumar ed., *Rebuilding society after civil war: critical roles for international assistance*, Lynne Rienner, Boulder-London, p.45

²⁵ Call, C.T. & Stanley, W. (2002). *Civilian security*. In: S.J. Stedman, D. Rothchild & E.M. Cousens eds., *Ending civil wars: the implementation of peace agreements*, Lynne Rienner, Boulder-London, p.319.

Also the aspect of universality of norms and values plays a role. As Christine Bell notes, “*human rights institutions within a peace agreement cannot be separated from the proposed role and scope of the political institutions*”²⁶. However these political institutions and consequently the human rights institutions, are modelled on Western liberal ideas of judicial enforcement²⁷. This may not be shared by the local population which will cause problems for the implementation of the program.

Liberal peace

During the first years of application of this approach, it has, in the form of Structural Adjustment Programmes of the World Bank, often had a negative impact. Problems relating to dependency, incoherence, and wrong duration evolved²⁸. Therefore adjustments were made: democratization should henceforth go gradually and controlled; elections should reward moderation; there should be peace-oriented adjustment policies; coordination should be effective and the time frame realistic²⁹.

In practice however the approach has often failed to provide the sorts of stability and economic growth envisioned³⁰. The financing is often delayed, which is harmful³¹. Other disadvantages are that policies of the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) of macroeconomic restraint the public expenditures that are essential to peace. The policies also tend to increase and exacerbate economic inequalities, and tend to create more unemployment³². IFIs are also limited to their own charters, which prescribe them to only work with recognized governments³³. Then there is their preference to support visible, attractive, and potential successful projects. This may cause a self fulfilling prophecy in which aid is successful³⁴. Also some key political tasks of peace implementation tend to be underfunded³⁵. Summarizing, the interference of the international community depends on politics: what do they gain from it?

(un)critical peacebuilding

This theory has some differences in the methods of conflict resolution, but the same end goal. The dilemmas of the liberal peace approach should be dealt with³⁶ by including local knowledge, root causes, multidisciplinary analyses, and including an analyses of all possible outcomes of a mission³⁷. The approach recognizes that conflict resolution is about politics of donors³⁸. As a solution to these problems a transition should be made in the mind of the West, by seeing post-conflict operations as the first of many phases of international engagement in recovering countries. The international role should shift towards “*a more “ordinary” international development and monitoring presence*” and

²⁶ Bell, C. (2003). “*Human rights and minority protection*”. In: J. Darby & R. MacGinty eds., *Contemporary peacemaking: conflict, violence and peace processes*, Palgrave, Houndsmills-New York, p.172.

²⁷ Putnam, T.L. (2002). “*Human rights and sustainable peace*”. In: S.J. Stedman, D. Rothchild & E.M. Cousens eds., *Ending civil wars: the implementation of peace agreements*, Lynne Rienner, Boulder-London, p.248.

²⁸ Paris, R. (1997). “*Peacebuilding and the limits of liberal internationalism*”. In: *International Security* 22(2),p.85

²⁹ Paris, R. (1997). “*Peacebuilding and the limits of liberal internationalism*”. In: *International Security* 22(2),p. 81-8.

³⁰ Barakat, S. & Zycck, S.A. (2009). “*The evolution of post-conflict recovery*”. In: *Third World Quarterly* 30(6),p.1073.

³¹ Woodward, S.L. (2002). “*Economic priorities for successful peace implementation*”. In: S.J. Stedman, D. Rothchild & E.M. Cousens eds., *Ending civil wars: the implementation of peace agreements*, Lynne Rienner, Boulder-London, p.198.

³² Woodward S.L. (2002). “*Economic priorities for successful peace implementation*”. In: S.J. Stedman, D. Rothchild & E.M. Cousens eds., *Ending civil wars: the implementation of peace agreements*, Lynne Rienner, Boulder-London, p.192-3.

³³ Woodward S.L. (2002). “*Economic priorities for successful peace implementation*”. In: S.J. Stedman, D. Rothchild & E.M. Cousens eds., *Ending civil wars: the implementation of peace agreements*, Lynne Rienner, Boulder-London, p.193-4.

³⁴ Woodward S.L. (2002). “*Economic priorities for successful peace implementation*”. In: S.J. Stedman, D. Rothchild & E.M. Cousens eds., *Ending civil wars: the implementation of peace agreements*, Lynne Rienner, Boulder-London, p.197.

³⁵ Woodward S.L. (2002). “*Economic priorities for successful peace implementation*”. In: S.J. Stedman, D. Rothchild & E.M. Cousens eds., *Ending civil wars: the implementation of peace agreements*, Lynne Rienner, Boulder-London, p.205.

³⁶ Although Paris & Sisk claim that this is extremely difficult and that they at best can be managed, not resolved. (Paris, R. & Sisk, T.D. (2009). “*Conclusion: confronting the contradictions*”. In: R. Paris & T. Sisk eds., *The dilemmas of statebuilding: confronting the contradictions of postwar peace operations*, Routledge, London-New York, p.309)

³⁷ Paris, R. & Sisk, T.D. (2009). “*Conclusion: confronting the contradictions*”. In: R. Paris & T. Sisk eds., *The dilemmas of statebuilding: confronting the contradictions of postwar peace operations*, Routledge, London-New York, p.311.

³⁸ Paris, R. & Sisk, T.D. (2009). “*Conclusion: confronting the contradictions*”. In: R. Paris & T. Sisk eds., *The dilemmas of statebuilding: confronting the contradictions of postwar peace operations*, Routledge, London-New York, p.313.

exit should be seen as a process instead of an event³⁹. A specific critique on this approach is that, for the sake of safety, the process of democratization should not go slowly but as fast as possible⁴⁰.

Disadvantages of community-oriented analytical approach

This does not mean however that the community-oriented analytical approach only has advantages.

First of all it is the question whether local actors have the means to be involved in conflict resolution. After conflict, countries tend to be poor and many are in need of help. The resources will have shrunk in a short period of time.

Secondly the question arises whether local actors have the required knowledge. They do know much about the local context, but that does not make them conflict resolution experts, proves this quote: *"not all traditional practices lead to peace"*⁴¹. The organizations may not be very democratic – Grindle suggests that they often resist downward accountability⁴². Related to this is the loss of enthusiasm that catches many NGOs⁴³.

Thirdly, by using the old structures, and the same people, the chance exists of re-creating the conflict. Exclusionary structures and recruitment patterns, people with histories of political violence, provocation, and human rights violations, and the use of former clientele might sow the seeds of (re)new(ed) conflict and leave sectors of the civilian population unprotected^{44 45 46}.

Also, local NGOs can become financially dependent on the international community. This can question the amount of real ownership, especially seen the fact that the strategy of implementation will be heavily influenced by what the donors are willing to fund⁴⁷. NGOs can, as is the case with the international community, have an interest in the continuation of their program since it creates jobs⁴⁸. All these aspects might influence the policy and results of NGOs.

Consequently the trust of the population in its local strengths may be low, which again decreases the chance of success.

Another major disadvantage is that the authority of the local government might be (further) endangered⁴⁹. This approach actually avoids the real issue of citizens who need to be able to count on well-performing public organizations⁵⁰.

However most of these disadvantages can be solved by adapting the community-oriented analytical approach, which will be done in the subsequent paragraph.

³⁹ Paris, R. & Sisk, T.D. (2009). *"Conclusion: confronting the contradictions"*. In: R. Paris & T. Sisk eds., *The dilemmas of statebuilding: confronting the contradictions of postwar peace operations*, Routledge, London-New York, p.314.

⁴⁰ Mansfield, E. D., & J. Snyder (1995), 'Democratization and the danger of war', *International security*, 20(1) p.13. And: Hegre, H., T. Ellingsen, S. Gates, & N. P. Gleditsch (2001), 'Toward a democratic civil peace? Democracy, political change, and civil war 1816-1992', *The American Political Science Review*, 95(1) p.42.

⁴¹ Pouligny, B. (2005). *"Civil society and post-conflict peace-building: ambiguities of international programmes aimed at building 'new' societies"*. In: *Security Dialogue* 36(4), p.503

⁴² Grindle, M.S. (2004). *"Good enough governance: poverty reduction and reform in developing countries"*. In: *Governance* 17(4) p.541.

⁴³ Kumar, K. (1998). *"After the elections: consequences for democratization"*. In: K. Kumar ed., *Rebuilding society after civil war: critical roles for international assistance*, Lynne Rienner, Boulder-London, p.221.

⁴⁴ Call, C.T. & Stanley, W. (2002). *"Civilian security"*. In: S.J. Stedman, D. Rothchild & E.M. Cousens eds., *Ending civil wars: the implementation of peace agreements*, Lynne Rienner, Boulder-London, p.317

⁴⁵ Call, C.T. & Stanley, W. (2002). *"Civilian security"*. In: S.J. Stedman, D. Rothchild & E.M. Cousens eds., *Ending civil wars: the implementation of peace agreements*, Lynne Rienner, Boulder-London, p.313.

⁴⁶ Grindle, M.S. (2004). *"Good enough governance: poverty reduction and reform in developing countries"*. In: *Governance* 17(4),p.541.

⁴⁷ Woodward S.L. (2002). *"Economic priorities for successful peace implementation"*. In: S.J. Stedman, D. Rothchild & E.M. Cousens eds., *Ending civil wars: the implementation of peace agreements*, Lynne Rienner, Boulder-London, p.183.

⁴⁸ Woodward S.L. (2002). *"Economic priorities for successful peace implementation"*. In: S.J. Stedman, D. Rothchild & E.M. Cousens eds., *Ending civil wars: the implementation of peace agreements*, Lynne Rienner, Boulder-London, p.190.

⁴⁹ Grindle, M.S. (2004). *"Good enough governance: poverty reduction and reform in developing countries"*. In: *Governance* 17(4) p.540.

⁵⁰ Grindle, M.S. (2004). *"Good enough governance: poverty reduction and reform in developing countries"*. In: *Governance* 17(4) p.541.

Conclusion: a new community-oriented analytical approach

The first explanation of the community-oriented analytical approach is vague about the exact roles of the local and the international community, therefore more explanation is given here.

Even though there are many downsides, **the international community** can definitely help in conflict resolution, especially given its financial resources and powerful position. The international community has gained experience in conflict resolution and could therefore coordinate and mediate in the conflict resolution process, however in a more custom-made and demand-driven manner. Local actors should sense when and what form of conflict resolution is needed, and then ask external actors what they need, or external actors could ask them. The approach should be custom-made: fit to the specific needs of that area. In general the international presence should be limited to the minimum necessary for effective assistance, in which I agree on Lopez⁵¹. The fact that the smaller, less costly UN missions were most successful in solidifying the process of democratization proves the use of this⁵². Only in extreme cases, for example genocide, the international community should act on its own. When needed, the international community could take a leading role in coordination and planning, which is also suggested by Ball who states that the international community should be involved in: a) strategic planning B) coordination within the government and with the donor community and C) oversight of implementing bodies⁵³. Putnam has good suggestions for International Human Rights Organizations: they could “*facilitate the performance of key institutions, establish contacts and build working relationships from the government level down, solicit local NGO participation, and collect reliable monitoring and exchange of information*”⁵⁴. Also they can “*act as watchdogs regarding the treatment of [local and national NGOs and their members] they receive from government authorities*”⁵⁵.

The emphasis therefore should be on **local actors**. Most disadvantages will disappear when paying attention to the following.

1. Give local actors more credit and support. By giving them a voice, and leadership as far as possible, the problems of loss of enthusiasm and the lack of resources will be solved.
2. Manage the expectations of the local people⁵⁶. Although a local approach will strengthen the confidence in the own skills, it will stay extremely difficult to solve the conflict and rebuild the society.

This keeps us left with two problems. The first one is dependency on the international community. This will to some extent always be the case. Western NGOs are becoming more self-reliant, they can transfer this knowledge to local NGOs, but the problem will stay with this approach. But the local NGOs can demand more from the international community, and when they will be taken serious, this will solve the problem. However it will remain difficult. One promising fact is that many NGOs were able to free themselves from the tutelage of the government, and this might repeat itself with international actors⁵⁷.

⁵¹ Lopéz-Pintor, R. (1997). “*Reconciliation elections: a post-Cold War experience*”. In: Krishna Kumar ed., *Rebuilding society after civil war: critical roles for international assistance*, Lynne Rienner, Boulder-London, p.60

⁵² Lopéz-Pintor, R. (1997). “*Reconciliation elections: a post-Cold War experience*”. In: Krishna Kumar ed., *Rebuilding society after civil war: critical roles for international assistance*, Lynne Rienner, Boulder-London, p.59

⁵³ Ball, N. (1997). “*Demobilizing and reintegrating soldiers: lessons from Africa*”. In: Krishna Kumar ed., *Rebuilding society after civil war: critical roles for international assistance*, Lynne Rienner, Boulder-London, p.93

⁵⁴ Putnam, T.L. (2002). “*Human rights and sustainable peace*”. In: S.J. Stedman, D. Rothchild & E.M. Cousens eds., *Ending civil wars: the implementation of peace agreements*, Lynne Rienner, Boulder-London, p.257

⁵⁵ Putnam, T.L. (2002). “*Human rights and sustainable peace*”. In: S.J. Stedman, D. Rothchild & E.M. Cousens eds., *Ending civil wars: the implementation of peace agreements*, Lynne Rienner, Boulder-London, p.258.

⁵⁶ Chesterman, S. (2004). “*Relief and reconstruction: the politics of humanitarian and development assistance*”. In: *You the people: the United Nations, transitional administration and state-building*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, p.196.

⁵⁷ Kumar, K. (1998). “*After the elections: consequences for democratization*”. In: K. Kumar ed., *Rebuilding society after civil war: critical roles for international assistance*, Lynne Rienner, Boulder-London, p.220.

The last problem is the threat for the government. In the short term this will remain a problem. However, once the First needs are fulfilled, NGO employees could be stimulated to work for the government. These people often have support from the population, and have skills to take leadership.